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Loan Commitments and Monetary Policy
ABSTRACT
The impact of loan commitment agreements on the way in which changes
in modetary policy affects the economy is examined. In particular, the
empirical relevance of quantity credit rationing in the transmission of
monetary policy is studied with VAR models. We find evidence of a dif-
ferential impact of monetary policy on loans under commitment and not
under commitment. Our conclusion is that credit rationing for bank
loans does occur, although loan commitments effectively protect borrowers
from credit rationing. Thus, loan commitments which insulate borrowers
from the effects of quantity rationing force monetary policy to work ex-


















About three-quarters of all bank loans to business in the U.S.are made
under loan commitment agreements.Under these agreements, banks promise to
provide borrowers with funds, up to a ceiling, any time when the needarises,
during the term of the agreement.If and when the commitment is used the
borrower pays an interest rate that is usually related to market ratesat the
time.
In this paper we examine the impact of these commitmentson the way in
which changes in monetary policy affect theeconomy. In particular, we
examine the empirical relevance of quantity creditrationing in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. A loan commitment, at least inthe
short run, insulates borrowers from the possibility ofbeing quantity
rationed.So, if indeed such rationing is important we should find that a
tightening of monetary policy has a different effect on loans under commitment
than on other business loans. If this turns out to be thecase, the important
Implication is that loan commitments by making quantity rationinglargely
irrelevant, force monetary policy to work only through interest rate changes.
To the extent the interest rate channel is less reliable than thequantity
rationing channel, the effectiveness of monetary policy will be reduced.
So the main hypothesis we will be testing is whether a tightenedmonetary
policy has a different effect on loans under commitment than on other business
loans.To test this hypothesis we disaggregate bank loans into loans under
commitment and loans not under commitment and we do causality testsusing
vector autoregressions *2
We believe our study makes two important contributions. First, by
disaggregating loans, we devise an empirical test of credit rationing.
Second, we use a data set that to the best of our knowledge has not been
analyzed in the past.This data set comes from a monthly survey of large
banks, the Federal Reserve has been carrying out since 1973.The survey
gathers information on the volume of loans under commitment and on total
unused commitments.
The paper is arranged as follows.In section 2, the loan commitment
arrangement is briefly described and our data set is presented and discussed.
Section 3 specifies our hypotheses concerning the channels of monetary policy
and relates them to the literature. Causality tests are presented in section
it and the results are summarized in section 5.
2. LOAN COMMITMENTS
2.1.Institutional Structure
A loan commitment obligates the lender to make loans up to a maximum
amount but typically it does not fix the interest rate at which the loan will
be made.1 Most often this rate is a premium over the prime rate. Usually,
commitment agreements last about a year and are often routinely rolled over.
In addition, to the interest charge paid when the commitment is used, there is
a fee paid on the unused portion of the commitment. Typically, this fee is
11t is important to note here that the term loan commitments covers a number
of diverse arrangements.For example lines of credit, back—up lines of
credit, term loan commitments and revolving credit arrangements all go under
this heading.3
about0.LI% of the unused volume so that maintaining an unused commitment is
expensive.In return for the fee, potential borrowers can obtainfinancing
without further application or review. However, it is also thecase that loan
commitments often include provisos concerning the borrowers continuedcredit
worthiness.
2.2. Data
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve began ItsSurvey of
Commercial and Industrial Loan Commitments at Selected Large CommercialBanks
in 1973. The monthly survey of approximately 120 banks is thesource of our
data on commitments. These data Include both formal contractual andinformal
agreements between the lender and borrower. A consistent seasonally adjusted
time series of the data was prepared by David Small of the Board'sBanking
Studies Section. Some further adjustments werenecessary to make the data
consistent with the survey releases after some recent bank mergers.2 Aplot
of data from the loan commitments survey is in Figure 1. It shows thevolume
of C&I loans under commitment and also the volume of unused loancommitments
for the period 1973 to 1985.
Unfortunately, the loan commitments survey does not collect data on the
volume of total C&I loans. The best source of data on the total volume of C&I
loans Is the seasonally adjusted time series prepared by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis from the Federal Reserve Board'ssurvey of large weekly
2The original data (not corrected for bankmergers) are published in Board
Statistical Release G.21.reporting banks.3 These data are sufficiently comparable to the data from the
loan commitments survey to be used together. Figure 2 which shows the volume
of c&r loans and the level of Ml, provides some indication of the importance
of C&I loans. C&I loans outstanding are almost half as large as the money
supply and have grown at a similar rate over the last 15 years.
The large weekly reporting banks (banks with current assets in excess of
$1.11 billion) own about half of all U.S. commercial bank assets.Table 1
shows the major asset categories for these banks at the end of 198'LAll
asset categories over 10% of total assets are shown. Since more than two—
thirds of all C&I loans are made under commitment agreements, loans under
commitment are larger than the next largest asset category (real estate
loans). Thus, it is clear that the distinction between C&I loans made under
commitment and not made under commitment is worth exploring. It is well known
that the other major bank asset categories --investments,real estate loans,
loans to individuals --behavevery differently with respect to monetary and
real changes in the economy. It is our purpose to see whether similarly large
behavioral differences exist for the components of the largest category -C&I
loans.
Many observers have the impression that the proportion of loans made under
series has been corrected to account for breaks in the data and the
weekly data were aggregated to form the monthly series used here. There are
now 168 large weekly reporting banks in the sample that provides the total
loan data. There are 119 large banks in the loan commitments survey. Since
there is considerable overlap between the two samples, we feel that the two
series can be used together for time series analysis.5
commitment has been increasing. However, the data shown in Figures 1 and 2
and summarized in Table 2 do not support this. The proportion of the total
volume of outstanding C&I loans made under commitment does not show any
discernible trend.
The impression of increasing Importance of loan commitments comes from
another data source which provides information on the terms of new loans: the
quarterly Survey of the Terms of Bank Lending that the Federal Reserve Board
has conducted since 1977.This survey collects data from 34O banks on the
terms of new loans.Among the information collected Is the percent of new
loans made under commitment. Table 3 shows the percent of new C&I loans made
under commitment for a subsample of 148 large banks. It indicates that there
has been a rapid increase in the fraction of new loans made under commitment.
The apparent discrepancy can be understood if we remember that the data in
Figures 1 and 2 and the growth rates In Table 2 are based on stock data while
the data from the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending in Table 3 are flow data, A
larger fraction of new loans are made under commitment and the proportion of
total loans outstanding under commitment is apparently unchanged. These two
observations are consistent because the average term of loans under commitment
has been declining.
A final interesting aspect of the data in Figure 1 is the rapId rise in
the volume of unused loan commitments. To a large extent this reflects the
fact that many issuers of commercial paper are required to take out credit
lines to reduce risk. Also, some unused commitments may be unuseable if the6
borrower does not satisfy the performance criteria in the agreement.
Nevertheless,this enormous stock of unused commitments could have
implications for both the role rationing plays in the transmission of monetary
policy and for the health of the banking system.For the banking system,
unused commitments represent a potential liability which raises questions of
capital adequacy.For the macroeconomy, the unused commitments have the
potential of enabling the economy to avoid quantity rationing in periods of
monetary tightness.
Although the commitments survey data and the data on total C&I loans are
not exactly comparable, it is worth while to investigate the similarities and
differences in the behavior of the two series. We do so by comparing the
growth rates of the two series over different cyclical episodes.We can
isolate three reference cycle recessions in the available time period.In
addition we can identify three periods which are commonly called credit
crunches.5Table 2 shows the annualized growth rates of loans under
commitment and total C&Iloansin each of these periods.In periods of
economic and financial distress there is a tendency for loans under commitment
to grow more rapidly than total C&I loans.This observation confirms our
initial hypothesis that policy may have a differential impact on loans made
The data from the Survey of the Terms of Bank Lending will not be used
further for two reasons.First, our interest is in the total bank balance
sheet so that the new loans data is not relevant. Second the data are only
available quarterly for a short period -since1977.
5The reference cycles are the standard NBER-BCD dating. The credit crunches
are based on suggestions made by Eckstein and Sinai (1986).7
under commitment and those not. Loan commitments are used more intensively in
periods of distress for the simple reason that they are by their very nature a
form of insurance against such situations.
3.LOANCOMMITMENTS AND THE TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY
3.1.TheAvailability Doctrine
The notion that quantity credit rationing is important in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy, can be traced back to the availability doctrine
developed in the 19508.6 According to this doctrine, monetary policy
influences the real economy, through the availability of bank loans. A
tightening of monetary policy by creating a reserves shortage raises the cost
of funds to banks.The higher bank input costs, affect bank loans in two
ways: through loan rates and through quantity rationing.
As their input costs rise, banks may raise loan rates, causing businesses
to curtail investment and consumers to postpone purchases. We call this the
"interest rate channel".It suggests a causal relationship from monetary
policy to bank loan rates, to the quantity of bank loans, to real economic
activity.
The availability doctrine actually emphasized quantity rationing rather
than loan rate changes as the primary cause of a monetary policy induced
economic slowdown. Quantity rationing refers to a reduction in loans over and
6Seeforexample Kareken (1957), Scott (1957) and Tussing (1966).8
above any interest rate induced reduction.7 As the bank input costs rise,
banks do not raise loan rates sufficiently to clear the market and resort to
credit rationing.8 We call this the "credit rationing channel" and it implies
a direct causal link from changes in monetary policy to changes in bank loans
and hence to real economic activity.9
Both versions of the availability doctrine are based on two important
assumptions. First it is assumed that a Fed induced change in reserves will
have a significant impact on the cost of funds to the banking industry. But
banks experiencing a reserves shortage, can always purchase funds or liquidate
their government securities portfolio.So if the supply of funds to the
banking industry is interest elastic, the Fed may fail to significantly raise
the input costs of banks and thus fail to achieve a reduction in bank loans.
A finding of no causality from a monetary policy indicator to bank loans
and/or loan rates will support this view.
7According to De Leeuw and Gramlich (1969), credit rationing can also
involve changes in loan terms (down payments, compensating balances) which
change the true price of borrowing without being reflected in explicit loan
rates.
8Scott (1957) suggested that a reason for this is the banks desire to avoid
risk.Kareken (1957) suggested a "lock-in" effect• because of the banks
unwillingness to sell long term securities at a loss in order to expand
business loans. More recently "equilibrium" credit rationing models have been
developed to explain why banks may not raise rates to clear the market. The
crucial ingredient here are information asymmetries. See for example Keeton
(1979) and Stiglltz and Weiss (1981, 1983).
9Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) and Blinder (1981), use the "equilibrium"
credit rationing models to emphasize the credit rationing channel.9
Second, there is the assumption that bank loans are unique, so that a
reduction in bank loans will inevitably lead to a slowdown in real economic
activity. This need not happen If there are close substitutes to bank loans,
for example commercial paper, corporate bonds and equity.In such a case
there may be a monetary policy induced fall In bank loans, but no effecton
real economic activity.
3.2. Effect of Commitments
The fact that most bank loans to business are made under commitment,
changes the picture dramatically. First of all, the great demand for loan
commitments, in Itself, can be viewed as evidence that borrowers fear they may
be quantity rationed in the future.Loan commitments are essentially an
Insurance policy. But insurance against what?Since most of these
commitments do not fix the loan rate in advance, it is not interest rate
uncertainty that borrowers are insuring against.10Moreover, since these
arrangements, typically can be reviewed if the creditworthiness of the
borrower deteriorates dramatically, they cannot be viewed as an insurance
against such an event.
One possibility is that loan commitments are a way of reducing transaction
costs and delays in satisfying an unanticipated urgent need for funds.
10Almost all of the theoretical work on loan commitments and creditlines
assumes that the loan rate is fixed in advance which is not always the case.
See for example Campbell (1978), Thakor, Hong and Greenbaum (1981), Thakor
(1983) and more recently Boot, Thakor and Udell (1986) and Greenbaum and
Berkovitch (1986). In our view, loan commitments emerge as a mechanism that
allows the avoidance of rationing effects on borrowers.10
Establishing a new banking relationship may involve extensive delays which can
be very costly.Furthermore, the customer may find that a new banking
relationship is not readily available with as attractive a credit rating.
However, given the high upfront fee expense it is hard to imagine that firms
obtain these commitments just to reduce transaction costs.
The most plausible explanation, is that loan commitments are a means of
insuring against the possibility of beingrationed:11 through these
commitments, companies make sure they will be able to get credit, at some
price, in the event of a credit crunch. In its absence, the unavailabilty of
funds may sometimes impose serious constraints on the operations of the firm.
The implications for monetary policy are clear.Since loan commitments
insulate borrowers from the danger of being quantity rationed in the future,
changes in monetary policy could only affect loans under commitment through
the interest rate channel. Essentially, under a loan commitment, the supply
of funds to the borrower is horizontal at the going market rate, up to the
commitment ceiling.12 If banks raise their lending rates in response to a
scarcity in reserves, we will be moving up the loan demand schedule. If banks
do not raise loan rates sufficiently to clear the market so that they have to
a few cases loan commitments may have a strategic motivation, e.g. to
indicate seriousness in a take-over bid.
2For simplicity in our discussion we assume the commitment ceilings do not
bind. Ham and Melnik (1985) find some evidence that for corporate borrowers
these ceilings occasionally bind. On the other hand, Sofianos (1986), finds
that for consumers, ceilings on bank credit cards do not bind.11
resort to rationing, it is those without commitment agreements that will be
rationed.Thus the brunt of the impact of a tightened monetary policy is
likely to fall on loans not under commitment.
Our maintained hypothesis is represented by case 3, in Table .Monetary
policy affects the cost of inputs to banks and this effect is transmitted to
the market for bank loans through both the interest rate channel and the
credit rationing channel.Loans are disaggregated into loans not under
commitment (NUC) and loans under commitment (LUC). The interest rate channel
is represented by arrows from monetary policy (MP) to loan rates (LR) to both
types of loans.13 The credit rationing channel is represented by the direct
arrow from monetary policy to loans not under commitment.Credit rationing
does not affect loans under commitment. We also hypothesise that bank loans
are unique, so that supply side induced changes in bank loans will affect real
economic activity (IP), hence the arrows from both types of loans to IP.
If only the interest rate channel is operating and there is no credit
rationing, there should be no direct effect from monetary policy to loans
under commitment: Case 2 in Table I.So the crucial test confirming the
presence of quantity rationing is direct causality from monetary policy to
loans not under commitment.Unless the two types of loans are examined
separately, any evidence of rationing may be obscured by the fact that the
3The interest rate effect on the two types of loans need notbe the same.
The only evidence on the interest rate elasticity of commitments and loan
demand under commitment can be found in Kim, Plaut and Melnik (1986). They
analyze a sample of loan commitments and conclude that there is considerable
interest elasticity of both loan demand and the demand for commitments.12
market is dominated by loans under commitment.
Table 4 also presents a number of other possibilities.If there are no
interest rate effects (e.g. if loan demand is interest inelastic), and only
the credit rationing channel is operating, monetary policy can affect real
economic activity only through loans not under commitment, Case 1.If bank
loans are not unique there should be no causation from either type of loan to
real economic activity, Case 4.Finally, Case 5, represents the situation
when monetary policy has no significant effect on bank inputs.14
3.3. Evidence on the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy
A recent paper by King (1986) examines the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy through bank loans.King finds evidence of a direct link
between a measure of liquidity (demand deposits) and economic activity, rather
than an indirect link through bank loans.15 Changes in bank loans do not
appear to Granger cause economic activity. This finding is confirmed in a
more recent study by Bernanke (1986). King also finds very little evidence
that banks ration loans, although banks themselves appear to be liquidity
constrained, especially in periods of "tight money".One interpretation of
these findings is that although the interest rate channel seems to be working,
14 Table 4 we only present policy induced causation patterns. Any reverse
causation from real economic activity to bank loans, loan rates and/or our
monetary policy measures we interprete as caused by changes in the demand for
loans.
15B Friedman (1982) reaches a somewhat different conclusion.He finds
that total credit is more closely related to real economic activity than
narrower measures of liquidity.13
the relevant interest rate elasticities are not big enough fora rise in
interest rates to cause a significant economic slowdown.
Another interpretation is that both the relationship betweenmonetary
policy and the supply of bank loans and the relationship between bank loans
and economic activity, are dominated by the large fraction of loans made under
commitment.It is necessary to disaggregate in order to see whether the
credit rationing channel is indeed important for loans not under commitment.
If this is the case, the conclusion would be that the increasingpopularity of
loan commitments has reduced the impact of monetary policy, by confining the
credit rationing channel to a small subset of loans. This possible
consequence of loan commitments was first noted by Wojnilower (1980).He
argues that the growth in commitments was a response to the threat of credit
crunches. He is primarily concerned, however, with their implications for the
adequacy of bank capital rather than on their impact on monetary policy.
1THEEMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In this section the channels of causality discussed in the previous
section are tested.VAR techniques are used to investigate causality among
monetary policy, interest rates, bank loans and economic activity.Vector
autoregressions are well suited for this type of investigation which focuses
on issues of causality without specifying a full structural model of all
relevant interrelationships. It is a valuable technique for testing
directions of causality among a set of variables with a model that does not
impose any structural priors.The VAR models are estimated from July 1973 to October 1985. The
estimation period is short because the loan survey data is only available
since 1973.16 The data are monthly which we believe is a distinct advantage
for examining the channels of monetary Influence.It is likely that many of
the existing causal patterns would be obscured with quarterly data.
The data on loans have already been extensively discussed in section 2.
The following terminology is used for the loan variables:GIL stands for
total C&I loans, LUC represents C&I loans made under commitment and NUG, C&I
loans not under commitment, NUCCIL -LUC.17The additional variables which
appear in the models are indicators of monetary policy, interest rates and a
measure of real economic activity.These variables were taken from the
Citibase data tape. The indicators of monetary policy tested are:
l6Although the period is short, it does include several full business
cycles.Making things more difficult for us the sample period includes at
least one important policy regime change. Unfortunately, the number of sample
points is too small to examine differences across regimes.
171n doing this disaggregation two issues must be considered.First, as
discussed in section 2, the data series for LIJC is not entirely comparable to
the series for CIL because the two series are constructed from two different
survey samples. The two samples are sufficiently similar so that we feel this
is not an important problem. Second, instead of constructing NUC In this way,
we could have estimated regressions with LUC and CIL and then tried to make
inferences about the behavior of NUC.For example, suppose monetary policy
affects CIL but it does not affect LUG. Does this imply that monetary policy
must affect NUC? The answer is no, not necessarily. The correlations of the
errors could be such that the results from an LUG, NUC specification can be
quite different from the results from an LUG, CIL specification. An
unexplained shock could have opposite effects on LUG and NUC, so that the
dynamic behavior of the aggregate series could be very different from that of
its components. We believe that nothing can be learnt about the behavior of
NUC by examining the behavior of LUC and GIL.15
Ml --Narrowlydefined money supply
DD --Totalbank demand deposits
NBR --Nonborrowedreserves
FF --Averageeffective Federal Funds rate.
Some of these can be viewed as truly exogenous (e.g. NBR) while others are
subject to feedback effects from the level of economic activity (e.g. Ml).
The interest rate variables used in our experiments are:
RCP --Commercialpaper rate
RP —-Primerate.
The commercial paper rate is a representative short-term interest rate
which is likely to vary closely with bank loan rates. We view it as a better
proxy for loan rates than the prime rate which is not as sensitive to changes
in financial conditions. Finally, the level of real economic activity Is
measured by the index of industrial production (IP).
Since the number of degrees of freedom Is limited (there are 160 monthly
observations), the VAR systems estimated restrict the number of lags to 12 for
each variable. All variables are in logs and the data (except interest rates)
are seasonally adjusted. Each VAR system includes trend and trend squared
terms.
The first set of relationships to be examined concern the transmission of
monetary policy shocks to loan rates and on to bank loans. Table 5 presents
the significance levels of the F statistics for Granger causality tests for
two systems.The first treats C&I loans as an aggregate and the second
separates them Into two parts depending on whether the loans are made under
commitment or not. The column heads represent the dependent variables. The16
significance of the determinants of the respective dependent variables is
found by reading down the column. An asterisk indicates significance at the
10% level.
Table 5(A) shows support for the credit rationing channel; there is a
direct effect from Ml to CIL.Although Ml strongly causes interest rates,
interest rates do not cause loans, so that the interest rate channel is
inoperative.However, in Panel (B) where CIL is disaggregated there is
evidence of both the interest rate and credit rationing channels. The
monetary policy indicator (Ml) has a direct effect on loans not under
commitment and no effect on loans under commitment. In addition, Ml affects
both types of loans indirectly through interest rates.The interest rate
effect on loans under commitment, however, is weak, significant only at the
15% level.18 The results here support our maintained hypothesis. Notice that
in both models there is feedback from RCP to Ml which reflects the fact that
the money supply Is to some extent endogenous.
A VAR system can also be used to calculate the proportion of each
variable's forecast error which can be attributed to the Innovations In each
variable In the model. This procedure is called a variance decomposition. It
requires Inverting the estimated autoregressive equations so that each
variable appears as a function of lags in the innovations in itself and the
other variables in the model. The variance decomposition uses an
18A joint significance test for the effect of both Ml and RCP on LUC was
carried out. No evidence of joined causality Is found (the F statistic is
1 .2k).17
orthogonalized version of the errors which depends on the ordering of the
variables.19 In all cases we use the ordering implicit in the discussion in
section 3.It is the order in which. the variables appear in Table 5.This
ordering assumes that monetary policy is exogenous and does not react to
economic conditions which might be the case in certain policy regimes.The
variance decomposition results are important because they provide some
indication of the magnitude of the relationships among the variables.
The variance decomposition results for the system shown in Panel (B) of
Table 5 are summarized in Table 6. The decomposition is shown for forecast
horizons of 12 and 36 months. Each entry in the table Is the percent of the
variance in the forecast error of the row variable attributable to the
variable at the column head. The results indicate that interest rates have a
small influence on both LUC and NUC (6% in both cases, at 36 months).
Contrary to our priors, Ml has a larger impact on loans made under commitment
than on loans not under commitment (22% and L% respectively, at 36 months).
This finding contradicts the results In Table 5(B).Forced to choose, we
believe the causality tests are the more reliable, since the variance
decompositions depend on the size of coefficients many of which are
individually insignificant.
In Table 7 we present causality tests with each of the models in Table 5
19Cooley and Leroy (1985) express some reservations about VAR modelling in
part because of this subjective element. However, the causality tests which
are our principle interest are not subject to this critique. In addition, the
variance decompositions for our results were largely robust to changes in the
ordering of the variables.18
extended to include industrial production.Panel (A) again provides strong
support for our maintained hypothesis.There is evidence of both direct
effects on C&I loans from monetary policy (rationing channel) and indirect
effects through interest rates. In addition bank loans cause real activity.
As before, there is feedback from RCP to Ml; although there is none from IP or
CIL to RCP.
The results in Panel (B) are for a five variable VAR system. We should
view these with some caution because the estimation uses up a large number of
degrees of freedom. Nevertheless, some interesting inferences can be drawn.
There Is a very distinct difference between loans under commitment and not
under commitment. C&I loans made under commitment are entirely exogenous. A
joint significance test for Ml, RCP and IP supports this exogenelty finding:
there Is no evidence of joint causality from these three variables to C&I
loans under commitment (the F statistic is 1.3).Loans not made under
commitment arrangements are affected both by interest rates and directly by
monetary policy (the rationing channel).The disappointing aspect of this
particular set of results is that contrary to our maintained hypothesis
interest rates do not affect loans under commitment.Another disappointing
result is the apparent exogeneity of industrial production.Loans neither
individually nor jointly have any significant effect on IP.2° A possible
explanation for this result is that bank loans are not unique. As mentioned
in section 3, a monetary policy shock which reduces loan volume may not effect
20The F statistic for the joint significance test Is 1.15.The critical
value at the 5% significance level is roughly 1.7.19
real activity if there are available substitutes for bank financing.
More generally, the exogeneity of industrial production can be interpreted
as supporting the real business cycle view which states that the financial
sector responds passively to exogenous real sector shocks (King and Plosser
(1984)).However, such an interpretation may be premature for two reasons.
First, although each individual variable in the I? regression is insignificant
there is some evidence that Ml, RCP, LIJC and NUC, jointly have some
explanatory power. The F statistic for this joint significance test is 1.55
which is slightly higher than the critical value at the 5% significance level
(1.52). Moreover, the differences between the results in Panels (A) and (B)
indicate some sensitivity of the causality orderings to specification changes.
As will be shown below this sensitivity does not depend on the choice of
monetary policy indicator or interest rates.Instead, it only depends on
whether CIL is disaggregated or not.
Although the causality tests in Panel (B) of Table T indicate that IP is
not significantly caused by loans, the variance decomposition results for the
system show sizeable effects. These results are shown In Table 8. There are
some reasonably large effects of the loan variables on IP when the forecast
horizon is lengthy. With a 36 month horizon, loans not under commitment have
a larger effect (10%) on the variance of forecast errors of IP than do loans
under commitment (6%). This provides some evidence that loans not under
commitment are more important in determining economic fluctuations.The
impact of interest rates on LUC and NUC are about the same size, while Ml has
a larger impact on NUC. This is consistent with the hypothesis that monetary20
policy has a larger direct effect on loans not under commitment: the
commitment arrangements imply that NUC bears the brunt of any rationing
effect. Again, like in Table 6, the direct effect of Ml is larger on LUC than
on NIJC which is contrary to our expectations.
The VAR models shown in Tables 5 and 7 are for the most part robust with
respect to changes in the specification of the interest rate and monetary
policy variables.Causality tests with alternative variable specifications
are shown in Table 9. The prime rate was tried as an alternative measure of
the loan rate. The results in Table 9(A) can be compared to those in Table
5(B) which use the commercial paper rate. As before the interest rate and Ml
channels are stronger on NUC than on LUC.
The next three panels of the table use alternative indicators of monetary
policy.The model in Panel B uses demand deposits as the monetary policy
variable like in King (1986). The results shown here suggest that loans under
commitment are exogenous. Similar results are found with the Federal Funds
rate (Panel C), but not with nonborrowed reserves (Panel D).In this last
system, the results are the opposite of what we expect.
King finds that Ml dominates C&I loans in causing economic activity.
However, his measure of economic activity is "nominal industrial production,"
the index of industrial production multiplied by the Consumer Price Index.
With that measure, his results are replicated with our data. Causality from
loans to nominal IP is weak (significant at the 10% level only) and causality
from Ml to the real sector is significant at the 5% level. There is however a21
readily available and more sensible monthly measure of aggregate nominal
economic activity: personal income.However, with personal income, both Ml
and C&I loans are exogenous. Generally, both ours and King's results indicate
some sensitivity to the specification of the real sector variable.
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Using vector autoregressions and a unique data set, we find some evidence
of a differential impact of monetary policy on loans under commitment and not
under commitment.Both types of loans respond to fluctuations in interest
rates, but loans not under commitment are also directly affected by monetary
policy. This result can be interpreted as evidence of quantity rationing of
loans not under commitment. Thus, the eagerness of borrowers to obtain, at
considerable expense, loan commitments can be understood as a desire to insure
against any such rationing.
Our conclusion is that credit rationing does occur in the market for bank
loans. However, loan commitments effectively protect borrowers from quantity
rationing. The implication is that loan commitments by insulating borrowers
from the effects of quantity rationing force monetary policy to work
exclusively through interest rate changes.The interest rate channel is
likely to be more slow and less reliable than the rationing channel, so that
the effectiveness of monetary policy will be reduced.This implication and
the observation that the volume of unused commitments has increased rapidly,
leads us to expect that monetary policy is likely to become even less
effective in the future.22
We consider our results in many respects preliminary. First, we only look
at business loans.Credit crunches may also have a differential impact on
household borrowing. Second, our data set on loan commitments only covers a
relatively short period. Third, tests based on structural models like that
specified by King (1986) and on mixed VAR-structural models as suggested by
Bernanke (1986) can throw more light on the whole issue. Finally, there is
another possible explanation for our finding that rationing has no effect on
loans under commitment.This may be so not because commitments effectively
protect borrowers from rationing but because the borrowers that get these
commitments are those that would not have been rationed anyway. Commitments
are useful for these borrowers as a signalling device. If this is the true
explanation then commitments have no implications for the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy.It is very difficult to distinguish between
these two alternative explanations, but clearly some attempt should be made.Figure 1
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Annualized Growth Rates of C&I Loans
Loans Under Total C&I
Commitment Loans
Overall sample period:
73—8 to 85—10 7.7 7.5
73—8 to 81—1 8.6 7.0
81—1 to 85—10 6.4 8.3
Recessions:
73—il to 75—3 20.9 13.7
80—1 to 80—7 —1.2 1.4
81—1 to 82—11 7.4 10.3
Credit crunches:
73—8 to 74—8 24.7 18.0
78—1 to 80—3 49.8 36.1
81—i to 82—1 14.4 13.5
Table 3










Source: Survey of Terms of Bank LendingTable 4: Possible Causation Patterns





2.Monetary Policy affects bank inputs, banks are unique, only interest
rates channel.
3. Monetary Policy affects bank inputs, banks are unique, credit
rationing and interest rates channels.
MP NUC











LUC: loans under commitment
NUC: loans not under commitment
IP:real economic activityTable 5
Significance Levels for Causality Tests
(A) Ml RCP CIL
Ml. 0.00* 0.00* 0.05*
RCP 0.01* 0.00* 0.54
CIL 0.41 0.44 0.00*
(B) Ml RCP LUC NUC
Ml 0.00* 0.00* 0.83 0.10*
RCP 0.00* 0.00* 0.15 0.01*
LUC 0.03* 0.59 0.00* 0.10*
NUC0.15 0.18 0.19 0.00*
Table 6
Variance Decomposition of VARSystemin Table 5(B)
Ml RCP LUC NUC
DependentVariable:
Ml
12 months 39 20 28 13
36 months 23 13 27 36
RcP
12 months 46 37 14 2
36 months 30 23 35 11
LUC
12 months 14 12 44 29
36 months 22 6 45 27
NUC
12months 4 4 16 76
36 months 4 6 18 72Table 7
Significance Levels for Causality Test With Industrial Production
(A) Ml RCP CIL IP
Ml 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.16
RCP 0.00* 0.00* 0.02* 0.23
CIL 0.71 0.60 0.00* 0.05*
IP 0.09* 0.32 0.02* 0.00*
(B) Ml RCP LUC NUC IP
Ml 0.00* 0.00* 0.49 0.07* 0.31
RCP 0.02* 0.00* 0.15 0.03* 0.58
LUC 0.19 0.45 0.00* 0.15 0.51
NUC0.05* 0.19 0.43 0.00* 0.24
IP 0.10* 0.18 0.30 0.].]. 0.00*
Table 8
Variance Decomposition of VRSystemin Table 7(B)
Ml RCP LUC NUC IP
Dependent Variable:
Ml
12 months 28 18 16 23 15
36 months 18 21 12 2]. 28
RCP
12 months 29 36 8 4 23
36 months 14 26 15 17 28
LUC
12 months 25 10 47 11 6
36 months 13 7 37 21 23
NUC
12 months 3 15 18 40 23
36 months 5 22 19 29 26
'P
l2months 7 7 4 3 78
36 months 8 19 6 10 57Table 9
Significance Levels With Alternative VAR Specifications
(A) Ml RP LUC NUC
Ml 0.00* 0.00* 0.44 0.20
RP 0.03* 0.00* 0.13 0.08*
LUC 0.29 0.11 0.00* 0.21
NIJC0.20 0.03* 0.13 0.00*
(B) DD RCP LUC NUC
DD 0.00* 0.01* 0.53 0.19
RCP 0.00* 0.00* 0.30 0.09*
LUC 0.20 0.70 0.00* 0.35
NUC0.27 0.85 0.14 0.00*
(C) FF RCP LUC NUC
FF 0.03* 0.21 0.45 0.23
RCP 0.60 0.04* 0.28 0.02*
LUC 0.38 0.52 0.00* 0.02*
NUC0.86 0.54 0.09* 0.00*
(D) RES RCP LUC NUC
RES0.00* 0.40 0.02* 0.29
RCP 0.45 0.00* 0.00* 0.12
LUC 0.43 0.06* 0.00* 0.27
NUC0.53 0.07* 0.18 0.00*REFERENCES
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